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IN THE SUP'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:'llAln'J;.J R. COX, 
Plaintiff, 
- vs. -
.r. R. Bl<~RRY, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plailitiff and Appellant, 
- vs. -
L. P. ~~LAOLE, JOSEPH ANDERSON, 
Y!\'L\:\' SCHELLAR, ROBERT GRA-
i i .'.~I arnl RILEY DRAPER, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10744 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
STA1'El\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Thi:-; is an artion by plaintiff :Marvin R. Cox to 
il'<'<1nr ('<>rtain funds allegedly borrowed by the defen-
dant ,J. H. B<>ny as part of the purchase price for the 
i111relim:e of the Homestead Hotel in Wasatch County. 
I ldPrnlant .T. R. Bt>rry filed a third-party complaint 
11 l11'1'1'ill l1P allPged to have been acting in a corporate 
"H11a<'it_,. for Zions Investment Corporation, and claimed 
1lw1 ii> r<>ason of certain hold harmless agreements be-
1 
tween himself and the third-party defendants that said 
third-party defendants would be liable to him for any 
amount found owing to the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The third-party defendants filed a Motion to Dis-
miss supported by affidavits. A counter-affidavit was 
filed by J. R. Berry in opposition to the Motion to Dis-
rmss. The matter was heard before the Honorable 
Stewart 1L Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, and the Motion to Dismiss was granted in the form 
o.f a Summary J udgrnent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Summary .Judg-
ment of the District Court, and reinstatement of his third-
party complaint against the third-party defendants. 
The issues in this appeal relate solely to the issues 
between defendant and third-party plaintiff J. R. Berry 
and third-party defendants Li. P. Slagle, Joseph Ander-
son, Vivian Schellar, Robert Graham and Riley Draper. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the trial court granted a Summary 
Judgment in favor of the respondents, the Supreme 
Court is obliged to consider the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, 
which in this case is the appellant J. R. Berry. Whitrna11 
2 
1 
is. TV. T. GrMit Compmiy, 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918. 
In this regard and for the purposes of this appeal, the 
fads as alleged in appellant's affidavit must therefore 
hc eonsidered as being true. Those facts are as follows 
(l{-21): 
l. That J. R. Berry is the defendant and third-party 
plaintiff in the above-entitled case. 
2. That prior to November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry 
1rns president and a member of the board of directors 
of Zions Investment Co.rporation, a Utah corporation. 
3. That prior to November 11, 1965, Zions Invest-
men t Corporation had acquired and was operating a 
certain property consisting of a resort in Wasatch 
County, Utah known as the "Homestead"; that when 
tht' I-Io1m"stead property was purchased, J. R. Berry 
personally became obligated on various notes and obli-
g-ations of the corporation in order to raise the neces-
~ary capital to make this purchase; that in order to 
Sf'Clffe the loans, advances, pledges of credit and guar-
antees which J. R. Berry made to the corporation, the 
Homestead }Jroperty was held in the name of J. R. 
Beny; that all o.f the parties, including the officers, 
di rPctors and stockholders of the corporation recognized 
t!H' Homestead property as being the property of the 
'orporation, and further recognized and acknowledged 
UH· sPenrity interest of J. R. Berry in and to said prop-
<'rty; that on November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry still claimed 
a 1-'<>curity interest in the Homestead property and record 
ti tlt> to the property was in his name. 
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4. That in addition to the Homestead propPrty, 
prior to November 11, 1965, J. R. Berry personally had 
agreed to t,ruarantee other loans and obligations of the 
corporation. 
5. That prior to November 11, 1965, various con. 
flicts, disputes and disagreements arose between .J. R. 
Berry and the other directors of the corporation; that 
.J. R. Berry was requested to resign as president and 
director of the corporation; and that at a duly-called , 
meeting of the board of directors held on November 11, 
1965, in which all directors were given notice, and a 
quorum was present, including all of the third-party de-
fendants, .J. R. Berry agreed to resign as president and 
director of the corporation and to convey to the cor-
poration the Homestead property on the co.ndition that 
the third-party defendants personally agree to hold him 
harmless from any and all debts and obligations of the 
corporation for which he had become personally liable; 
that thereupon at said meeting the parties prepared two 
copies in longhand of Exhibit 2 attached to defendant's 
Third-Party Complaint (R-6); that all of the parties 
signed and executed said agreement and that J. R. Berry 
retained one copy, and the other executed copy was de· 
livered to third-party defendants; that it was never the 
intention of any of the ]Jarties that any other directors 
sign the agreemmt other than those present at the mePt· 
ing of N overnber 11, 1965. 
6. 'l1hat following the met>ting of November 11, 19G5, 
and prior to tlw conveyanc·p of tlw H ornestead property 
to the corporation, all of the parties concludPd that their 
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agre(>1t1ent should be reduced to a more formal instru-
11wnt, and thus the document attached to defendant's 
Tl1ird-Party Complaint as Exhibit 3 (R-6a) was exe-
<·ntP<l hy the parties on November 17, 1965; that L. P. 
Sla1-dP and Vivian Schellar were not present at the meet-
ing of ~ ovember 17, 1965, but that the remaining third-
part? clef endants represented that they were in fact act-
ing for and on behalf of the two· absent parties, and 
tliat it "rnnld be unnecessary for them to sign the instru-
n1Pnts; that based upon said representation and upon 
tliP prior agreement, J. R. Berry delivered to third-party 
df·frndants the conveyances to the Homestead property, 
tl10reh.Y giving up his security interest; that all of the 
third-party defendants did immediately thereafter record 
or «ause to be recorded said conveyances. 
7. That J. R. Berry further in accordance wit!i the 
agTPPrnent, did in fact resign as president and director 
nf 7,ions Investment Corporation, and thereafter took 
no voice in the control and managem~nt of the co.rpor-
aticm. 
8. That the books and records of Zions Investment 
('o.rporation show a resolution in the following words: 
"Discussion was had on the offer of Mr. Berry, 
in thf' best interest of the corporation, to resign 
as an officer and director, subject to his being 
hPld harmless from any contingent or direct lia-
bilities he incurred while serving in such capaci-
ties. Upon motion of Graham, seconded by An-
d<'rson, the following resolution was unanimously 
adoptf'd: 
HE l'T RESOLVED: That the resignation of 
.T ark R. Berry be aceepted, effective immediately, 
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and the corporation, and their directors, agree to 
fully hold him harmless from any claim of am-
kind assertf•d against him by reason of his ~­
tivities as an officer and director of the corpor-
ation, including the several notes and mortgage~ 
upon which Mr. Berry appears as obligor, tlw 
proceeds of which were received by the corpor-
ation, and excepting from the said hold harmlt>s~ 
provision, any and all acts of said Berry for and 
on behalf of the corporation determined bv a 
court of competent jurisdiction to constitut~ a 
willful or intentional violation of law." 
That the above resolution is signed by J. R. Berry and 
by all of the above-named third-party defendants. 
ARGUMI:~NT 
POINT I 
THE HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
J. R. BERRY AND THE OTHER DIRECTORS OF 
THE CORPORATION ARE NOT VOID AS BEING 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, NOR DO THEY LACK 
LEGAL CONSIDERATION. 
The Summary Judgment of the trial court does not 
state the ground upon which it is based. Hmvever, the 
principal point argued in the trial court involved the 
question as to whether the agreements of the directors 
to hold J. R. Berry harmless from debts of the corpor-
ation were illegal and void because the consideration 
therefore, either in whole or in part, was Berry's agref'-
ment to resign as president and director of the corpor-
ation. In appellant's opinion, this is the only point raised 
in respondents' motion involving strictly a question of 
law. It was successfully urged by the respondents in till' 
lffwer court that such an agreement amounts to th!' 
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eqnivalf~nt of a trustee being "bought out of office" and 
is contrary to public policy. 
Appellant recognizes the general rule cited at §348 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 2, to the effect 
that a eorporate officer may not resign his position of 
trust for a pecuniary consideration, and that such an 
agr<'cnwnt is illegal and void. Fletcher points out that a 
director cannot accept payment for his resignation, 
;lf itchcll 1·s. Dilbeck, 10 Cal. 2d 341, 74 P.2d 233; that a 
dirPctor cannot resign in consideration of the corporation 
promising not to sue on his note given to the corpor-
at io.n, 1'. F. Pagel Lumber Company vs. Webster, 231 
\Vis. 222, 285 N.-w. 739; and directors cannot resign en 
urnssP and sell stock at an excessive price to permit 
looting of the corporation by new officers, Gerde vs. 
Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622. It is submitted by the appel-
lant that the rule of law stated by Fletcher, and the 
cases therein cited, do not uphold the position of respon-
dents that an agreemnt merely to hold an officer or 
director harmless from an obligation in which the cor-
poration is already the principal obligor is not a pecuni-
ary consideration as that term is used in the cases, nor 
is it the type of thing that by nature should be void as 
against public policy. 
Fletcher at §348, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corpor-
11t ir!/ls, Vol. 2, after setting forth the general rule, also 
points out types of resignation agreements that are legal 
and not objectionable. The last sentence of said para-
graph provides as follows: 
"\YherP the person advancing the money neces-
sary for working capital demanded that he be 
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elected president, it is proper for the directors 
to endeavor to secure the resignation of the prr. 
son then president, and the latter may impose as 
a condition of his resignation, it seems, that hP 
receive the amount owing him by the company 
and a reasonable allowance for giving up his sal-
aried position, and that his stock be taken off his 
hands." 
In Crespinel vs. Color Corporation of America, 
Calif., 325 P.2d 565, an agreement to pay a monetary 
consideration by the corporation to a resigning offieer 
was upheld. The court held that where there is a bona 
fide transaction and when it is in the best interest of 
the corporation that a director resign, a reasonable al-
lowance may be made for his resignation. 
In Joseph vs. Rabb, 81 N.Y.S. 546, it was held law-
ful for a director to resign for the best interest of the 
corporation and to condition his resignation on being 
relieved of his stock and paid the amount owing him and 
a reasonable allowance for giving up his position. 
In Ruffner vs. Sophie Mac Candy Corporation, 
Georgia, 132 S.E. 396, it was held that a corporation may 
in good faith to serve its best interests, accept the resig-
nation of its director-president, and in consideration 
purchase his shares of the corporation at an agn~ed 
valuation. 
In Mooney 1;s. Overland Willeys Motor Corporation, 
204 F.2d 888, a director resigned after a derivative suit 
had been instituted against him, and in consideration the 
corporation agreed to indemnify him for expenses in 
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connection therewith. It was held in the absence of an 
ulterior motive such a contract was enforceable. 
At 28 University of Cincinnati Law Review 380, ap-
pear8 a case note on the Crespinel case. In that artiele 
the author, after analyzing the recent cases, acknowledges 
that as a general 111le, any bona fide agreement will be 
npheld. 
~, lG-10-J ( o) Utah Code Annotated gives a corpor-
ation the power to indemnify directors and officers from 
<'xpen8es of litigation arising from their activities while 
acting as a corporate officer. If by statute a corporation 
can indemnify an officer for litigation expenses, it would 
seem that there should be no public policy against a cor-
poration or its directors agreeing to indemnify an officer 
from an obligation where the corporation is already the 
principal debtor. 
In the case before the court, J. R. Berry did not 
receive any payment for his resignation. Although he 
was a large stockholder, he did not ask that the corpor-
aticm or the remaining directots purchase his stock; he 
also had a salaried position with the corporation and 
a~ked for nothing as an allowance for giving up his 
position. The only thing he bargained for was that the 
n•rnaining directors hold him harmless from corporate 
obligations, which as a matter of agency law the cor-
poration as principal obligor would be required to do 
anyway. The cases cited by Fletcher in support of the 
gl'neral rule all seem to involve a detriment to the cor-
poration or its stockholders. Here there is no detriment 
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or loss to the corporation. The corporation is actually 
in a better position from the standpoint of its creditors 
because of the additional personal guarantees. There 
is no evidence that the agreements were made in bad 
faith. The directors requested Berry to resign and 
agreed to hold him harmless from corporate obligations. 
The parties to the agreement were all fully competent 
to enter into a contractual obligation, and it would be 
unconscionable to permit respondents to now completely 
ignore and evade their solemn promises. 
POINT II 
THE REl\IAINING GROUNDS FOR RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS INVOLVE EITHER FACTUAL 
OR IMMATERIAL ISSUES, AND WOULD NOT SUP-
PORT A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents set forth 
several other grounds in support of the motion. These 
grounds, for the most part, involve factual questions and 
would not be a proper basis for a judgment of dismissal. 
Appellant will treat each of these grounds separately. 
A. Contention that the Agreements Lack Consider-
ation. 
Respondents have claimed that the hold harmless 
agreements are invalid because they lack consideration. 
The consideration claimed is (1) Berry's agreement to 
resign as an officer and director of the corporation and 
(2) Berry's agreement to give up his security interest 
in the Homestead property. Appellant submits thal 
either of these considerations would support a valid 
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contract. As to the agreement to resign, the authorities 
are covered under Point I of this brief. As to the giv-
ing np of the security interest, respondents have claimed 
that because of representations in the corporate pros-
prctus and otherwise to the effect that the corporation 
was the owner of the Homestead property that Berry had 
a pre-existing duty to convey the property to the cor-
poration. Berry never has claimed to be the owner of 
the Homestead property but claimed to be holding the 
titlr only as security for the liabilities he had personally 
undertaken for the corporation. His affidavit alleges 
that the corporation and all of its officers and directors 
acknowledged and recognized his security interest in the 
pro1wrty. ·whether J. R. Berry had such a security in-
terest is strictly a question of fact. 
B. Contention that the Hold Harmless Agreements 
are Conditional Upon All Dfrectors Signing. 
The hold harmless agreements relied upon by J. R. 
BPITY consist of three documents. They are (1) the 
hand written agreement found at page 6 of the record 
herein, ( 2) the corporate resolutions signed by all par-
ties and entered into the minute book of the corporation 
as shown at paragraph 8 of Berry's affidavit (R-24), 
and ( 8) the formalized agreement found at page 6-A of 
thP rneord herein. 
The first two documents ref erred to above were 
~ig1wd hy all of the third-party defendants. The third 
(locurnent was signed by three of the five third-party 
<1P f t·n<lants. 
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17 C.J.S. Contracts ~62 sets out the general rulPs 
with resped to the required number o.f signatures on a 
contract. Beginning at page 735, it is stated as followH: 
"'rhe question as to "-hether those who haw 
signPd are bound is gPnerally to be determinPd 
by the intc>ntion and understanding of the par-
ties at the time of the execution of the instrument. 
The reason for holding the instnunent void is that 
it was intended that all the parties should execuh· 
it and that each executes it on the implied con-
dition that it is to be executed by the others, and, 
therefore, that until executed by all it is inchoatP 
and incomplete and never takes effect as a valid 
contract, and this is especially true where the 
agreement expressly provides, or its manifest in-
tent is, that it is not to he binding until signed. 
''\'{here these reasons do not apply, it is usually 
hPld that a party who signs and delivers an in-
strument is bound by the obligations therein as-
sumed, although it is not executed hy all of the 
parties named in it, as, for example, where all 
the parties recognize the validity of the contract 
and acquiesce in its perfonnance. Usually, how-
ever, a party may, on signing, impose an enforce-
able condition that the agreement is not to be bind-
ing until signed by others. 
"It is competent for the parties to adopt a writ-
ten instrument as their contract without signing 
it, provided their intention to do so is clear." 
Cases cited for thP above rule are as follows: 
Kaneko vs. Okuda, 195 C.A. 2d 2J7, 15 Cal. Rptr. 292, 
holding that in the absence of showing that contract is 
not to be dPemed complete unless signed by all parties. 
parties signing may he bonn<l though others have no·t 
signed. 
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Elick vs. Schiller, Texas, 235 S.W. 2d 494, holding a 
contract is binding on those who sign it, in absence of 
a showing that signature was obtained by trick or artifice. 
Winter vs. Kitto, California, 279 Pac. 1024, holding 
that where sufficient consideration for signers agree-
nwnt is shown from the instrument itself, signer cannot 
bP released because other persons failed to sign. 
flank of U.S. vs. Chemical Bank & Trust Company, 
246 N.Y.S. 595, holding that one signing and delivering 
an instrument not signed by all parties intended is bound 
unless signer indicates to obligee intent not to be bound 
until others sign. 
Schlosl)(c;rg vs. Shannan and Luchs Company, D.C., 
5;) A. 2d 722, holding that mere expectation that another 
wi 11 sign does not necessarily prevent those signing from 
heing hound even though expected party does not sign. 
In the instant case, the affidavit of J. R. Berry 
~tates that it was not the intention of any of the parties 
that any additional parties sign the first two instru-
ments. Again, this involves a question of fact. The evi-
dence ·would show that appellant and third-party defen-
dants were all of the directors present at the meeting 
whPre the documents were signed and that there was 
no discussion that any other party would sign the same. 
l•'urther, the third tn)ewritten document had the names 
of tlH· five third-party defendants typed in for signature, 
indirating that there was no intent for any additional 
c;i1-,111atures. 
As to the third instrument, it is true that it was 
r·cmtrn1pla ted that five parties should sign. Whether 
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the three who signed intended to he bound is again a 
question of fact. Berry's affidavit alleges that the signern 
expressly stated to him that it would be unnecessary for 
others to sign. They accepted the instruments conveying 
the homestead property and recorded tlwm. It would 
seem that after having accepted the benefits of their bar-
gain they cannot now say that they had no intention to 
be bound. In any event, either of the first two docunwnts 
would impose liability upon all of the third-party defen-
dants even if the third document, which was signed by 
only three of the respondents, were a complete legal 
nullity. 
C. Contention that the Agreements Were Condi-
tional Upon the Corporation Signing the Agreement" 
It \Vas contended in respondent's motion to dismiss 
that the first agreement, the hand written agrernent, was 
not properly executed by the corporation because it was 
signed by Joseph Anderson, Secretary. The signature 
line does not say Secretary of what. This contention is 
completely without merit. Mr. Anderson signed thr 
agreement in two place8 - .JilCe for himself personally 
and once as sccertary for the corporation. The agree-
ment refers to Zions Investment Corporation so there 
can be no misunderstanding as to what corporation signed 
the agreement. Mr. Anderso.n, as shown by his affidavit, 
also is in fact the secretary of Zions Investment Cor-
poration. The only possible interpretation is that Mr 
Anderson signed the agreement for himself and for 
Zions Investment Corporation. Even if the corporation 
had not signed this agn~ement, it would be immaterial 
as to tlw liability of thP third-party dPfendants. Thi~ 
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is so (l) because of the same reasons and authorities 
l'ited nnder Point II B. of this brief and (2) the corpor-
ntion, as principal obligor, would be liable to Berry any-
wa~T for obligations of the corporation which Berry p€r-
sonally guaranteed. 
D. Contention that Berry Did Not Resign. 
Hespondents claims that the hold harmless agree-
ment was invalid because Berry did not resign his office 
as President and Director of the corporation. This is 
rlrarly a factual matter. Berry's affidavit states that he 
did resign. There is also a corporate resolution signed 
by all of the parties accepting the resignation. 
According to §346 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 
Vol. 2, the resignation of an officer is a factual question 
and all that need be shown is something evidencing a 
clf;ar intent to resign. Further, the resignation need not 
takP place at a regular corporate meeting. 
Contention that the Meeting of November 11 
Whcrrin The First Hold Harmless Agreement Was 
ifigncil Was Not a Valid Meeting. 
Respondents have contended that the corporate meet-
ing of November 11 wherein the first hold harmless agree-
11wn t was signed was not a valid meeting because the 
noticPs of the meeting were two days late in getting out. 
Whether or not the meeting was proper is not even 
a matPrial fact in this case. Appellant's theory is that 
tl1" third-party defendants are liable on a personal agree-
11wnt. The corporation was already liable as a simple 
inn t1 <'l' of agPnc·y law. 
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Appellant is unaware of any principle of law that 
would require a formal directors meeting to bind an in-
dividual, not the corporation, to a contract. 
F. Contention That The Agreements Lack Delivery. 
This contention merely concerned the fact that ap-
pellant failed to allege delivery of the instruments in 
his complaint. The trial court at the time of hearing 
permitted an amendment by interlineation so this point 
1s no longer involved on appeal. 
G. Contention That The Agreement is Void Be-
cause of Uncertainty. 
The first agreement between the parties purports 
to indemnify Berry for "all activities which I partici-
pated in while President and Director o.f the Corpor-
ation, excepting embezzlement." AppPllant contends that 
there is nothing vague or ambiguous about the word 
"all." However, even if there were an ambiguity or un-
certainty, the court is not involved with the question of 
statutory intPrpretation. If ambiguous, extrinsic evi-
dence is generall;.' permissible in interpreting contracts. 
This is a case where the legal maxim id certurn est qnod 
certurn reddi votest (that is certain which can be made 
certain) is applicable. See Am. Jitr. 2d Contracts 077. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing authorities, appel-
lant respectfully submits that the summary judgment of 
the trial court dismissing defendant's third party com-
plaint be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, 
RAWLINGS & WEST 
By David E. West 
Attorneys for Deferi,dant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
1300 vV alker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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